

Synthesizing Robust Systems

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Robustness

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- The most basic controller designs do not explicitly address robustness, but they are robust against **unmodeled** disturbances.
- Can the same be done for software?

Robustness

What is known about software robustness?

In Computer Science:

- Recent work by Bloem, Chatterjee, Chaudhuri, Gulwani, Henzinger, Jobstman, Majumdar, ...
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In Control Theory:

- There is a subfield of control theory called robust control;
- The following classification will be useful:
 - State based methods (modern view) (first part of the talk);
 - Input-output based methods (older view originated from the analysis of amplifiers and other electrical circuits) (second part of the talk).

State based robustness

Towards a definition

We start with a plain automaton.

Definition

A finite-state automaton is a triple $A = (Q, \Sigma, \delta)$ consisting of:

- A finite set of states Q ;
- A finite set of (control) inputs Σ ;
- A transition function $\delta : Q \times \Sigma \rightarrow Q$.

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How to reason about **modest** deviations from the nominal behavior?

State based robustness

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We introduce **metric** automata.

Definition

A finite-state **metric** automaton is a sextuple $A_\beta = (Q, d, \Sigma, X, \beta, \delta)$ consisting of:

- A finite set of states Q ;
- A **metric** $d : Q \times Q \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_0^+$;
- A finite set of (control) inputs Σ ;
- A finite set of (disturbance) inputs X including a special symbol ϵ denoting nominal (no disturbance) behavior;
- A parameter $\beta \in \mathbb{R}_0^+$ defining the “power” of the disturbance;
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
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It seems that we are explicitly modeling the disturbances through the transition function δ .

State based robustness

Disturbance model


Nominal transition:



State based robustness

Disturbance model

All the disturbed transitions:




$$d(\delta(q, \sigma, \epsilon), \delta(q, \sigma, x)) \leq \beta \quad \forall q \in Q, \sigma \in \Sigma, x \in X.$$

State based robustness

Disturbance model

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The parameter β does not need to be known: results will be parameterized by β .

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We consider first reachability objectives encoded by a set $F \subseteq Q$.

- A trace s of A_β is winning for a reachability objective F if it enters F in finite time.


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Let $F = \{q_6\}$ be a reachability objective.




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
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
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
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Guarantee from q_0 : some state in the blue ellipsis is reached in finite time.

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Towards a definition

Some standard definitions:

- A **trace** $s \in Q^* \cup Q^\omega$ of the automaton A_β is a (finite or infinite) sequence of states $s = q_0 q_1 q_2 \dots$ from Q for which there exist control inputs $\sigma_0, \sigma_1, \sigma_2, \dots$ and disturbance inputs x_0, x_1, x_2, \dots satisfying $\delta(q_i, \sigma_i, x_i) = q_{i+1}$ for $i \geq 0$;

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- A **memoryless (control) strategy** for an automaton A_β is a function $S : Q \rightarrow \Sigma$ specifying a control input choice for each state $q \in Q$;
- A memoryless (control) strategy is winning for an automaton A_β if every trace of A_β complying with $S : Q \rightarrow \Sigma$ satisfies the acceptance condition.

State based robustness

A definition

Definition

A winning strategy for the automaton A_0 and reachability objective $F \subseteq Q$ is γ -robust if for any $\beta \in \mathbb{R}_0^+$ it is winning for the automaton A_β with reachability objective $\mathcal{B}_{\gamma\beta}(F)$:

$$\mathcal{B}_{\gamma\beta}(F) = \{q \in Q \mid d(q, F) \leq \gamma\beta\}.$$

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- The parameter γ describes how much F is inflated to obtain $\mathcal{B}_{\gamma\beta}(F)$.

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- Note that if there are no disturbances, $\beta = 0$ and $\mathcal{B}_{\gamma\beta}(F) = F$.
- The parameter γ describes how much F is inflated to obtain $\mathcal{B}_{\gamma\beta}(F)$.
- The map transforming environment strategies to the language accepted by A_β is uniformly continuous with modulus of continuity γ .

State based robustness

Verification and synthesis

Given an automaton A_0 , $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}_0^+$, and a strategy S one can ask:

- **Verification:** Is S γ -robust?
- **Optimal verification:** What is the smallest $\gamma \in \mathbb{R}_0^+$ for which S is γ -robust?

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All the above problems can be reduced to dynamic programming and are thus polynomially solvable.

All these results extend to Büchi and parity objectives¹.

¹ **A theory of ω -regular robust software synthesis**

Rupak Majumdar, Elaine Render, and Paulo Tabuada
To appear in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems.

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Critical assessment

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State based robustness requires a metric.

- What if I have two different automata defining the same language?
- How to reason about robustness before having an implementation with states?
- How to handle refinement and abstraction?

Input/output based robustness

Towards a definition

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Input/output based robustness

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 - Bounded disturbances should lead to bounded consequences;
 - The effect of a sporadic disturbance should disappear in finitely many steps;
 - Well known requirements in control theory that recently appeared as two separate notions of robustness: ² and ³.

² Synthesizing Robust Systems

R. P. Bloem, K. Greimel, T. Henzinger, B. Jobstmann

Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design, FMCAD 2009

³ Robustness of Sequential Circuits

L. Doyen, T.A. Henzinger, A. Legay, and D. Nickovic

Proceedings of the 10th International Conference on Application of Concurrency to System Design, ACSD 2010.



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Based on the control theoretic notion of Input-to-State Dynamic Stability we propose:

Definition

Given parameters $\gamma, \eta \in \mathbb{N}$, we say the transducer $f : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \Lambda^*$ is (γ, η) -Input-Output Stable (IOS) if for each $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ we have:

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Input/output based robustness

Some test cases

Some intuition for this inequality.

$$O(f(\sigma)) \leq \max_{\sigma' \preceq \sigma} \{ \gamma I(\sigma') - \eta (|\sigma| - |\sigma'|) \}$$

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$$O(f(\sigma)) \leq \max_{\sigma' \leq \sigma} \{ \gamma I(\sigma') - \eta (|\sigma| - |\sigma'|) \}$$

Consider the following sequence of input and output costs:

	σ_1	$\sigma_1\sigma_2$	$\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3$	$\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3\sigma_4$
I	0	0	0	0
$O \circ f$	0	1	0	0

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Hence, $\max_{\sigma' \preceq \sigma} \{ \gamma I(\sigma') - \eta (|\sigma| - |\sigma'|) \} = \max\{0, -\eta, -2\eta\} = 0.$

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IOS requires $O(f(\sigma_1\sigma_2)) = 1 \leq 0$ which does not hold!

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Consider the following sequence of input and output costs (persistent disturbance):

	σ_1	$\sigma_1\sigma_2$	$\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3$	$\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3\sigma_4$
I	0	2	2	2
$O \circ f$	0	0	4	4

We have 3 prefixes of $\sigma = \sigma_1\sigma_2$:

Input/output based robustness

Some test cases

Some intuition for this inequality.

$$O(f(\sigma)) \leq \max_{\sigma' \preceq \sigma} \{ \gamma I(\sigma') - \eta(|\sigma| - |\sigma'|) \}$$

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IOS requires $O(f(\sigma_1\sigma_2)) = 0 \leq 2\gamma$. At this point we can take $\gamma = 0$.

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$$\text{IOS requires } O(f(\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3)) = 4 \leq 2\gamma.$$

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IOS requires $O(f(\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3)) = 4 \leq 2\gamma$. A similar analysis for the remaining strings leads to IOS with $\gamma = 2$.

Input/output based robustness

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$$O(f(\sigma)) \leq \max_{\sigma' \preceq \sigma} \{ \gamma I(\sigma') - \eta (|\sigma| - |\sigma'|) \}$$

Consider the following sequence of input and output costs (sporadic disturbance):

	σ_1	$\sigma_1\sigma_2$	$\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3$	$\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3\sigma_4$
I	2	0	0	0
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I	2	0	0	0
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A similar analysis leads to the following constraints:

$$\begin{aligned} O(f(\sigma_1)) &= 0 \leq 2\gamma \\ O(f(\sigma_1\sigma_2)) &= 4 \leq 2\gamma - \eta \\ O(f(\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3)) &= 3 \leq 2\gamma - 2\eta \\ O(f(\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3\sigma_4)) &= 2 \leq 2\gamma - 3\eta \end{aligned}$$

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I	2	0	0	0
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A similar analysis leads to the following constraints:

$$\begin{aligned} O(f(\sigma_1)) &= 0 \leq 2\gamma = 6 \\ O(f(\sigma_1\sigma_2)) &= 4 \leq 2\gamma - \eta = 6 - 1 = 5 \\ O(f(\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3)) &= 3 \leq 2\gamma - 2\eta = 6 - 2 = 4 \\ O(f(\sigma_1\sigma_2\sigma_3\sigma_4)) &= 2 \leq 2\gamma - 3\eta = 6 - 3 = 3 \end{aligned}$$

IOS holds for $\gamma = 3$ and $\eta = 1$.

Input/output based robustness

A definition

Based on the control theoretic notion of Input-to-State Dynamic Stability we propose:

Definition

Given parameters $\gamma, \eta \in \mathbb{N}$, we say the transducer $f : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \Lambda^*$ is (γ, η) -input-output stable if for each $\sigma \in \Sigma^*$ we have

$$O(f(\sigma)) \leq \max_{\sigma' \preceq \sigma} \{ \gamma I(\sigma') - \eta (|\sigma| - |\sigma'|) \}.$$

- The parameter γ is called the *robustness gain*. It measures how much the disturbance is amplified.
- The parameter η is called the *rate of decay*. It measures how quickly the effects of a disturbance disappear.
- The notion of (γ, η) -input-output stability captures the two desired properties:
 - Bounded disturbances should lead to bounded consequences;
 - The effect of a sporadic disturbance should disappear in finitely many steps;

When is a transducer IOS?

Problem $((\gamma, \eta)$ -IOS Verification)

Given a transducer $f : \Sigma^ \rightarrow \Lambda^*$, input and output cost functions $I : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$ and $O : \Lambda^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$, respectively, and parameters $\gamma, \eta \in \mathbb{N}$, is the transducer f (γ, η) -IOS with respect to (I, O) ?*

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
Problem (IOS Verification)

Given a transducer $f : \Sigma^ \rightarrow \Lambda^*$ and input and output cost functions $I : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$ and $O : \Lambda^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$, respectively, does there exist $\gamma, \eta \in \mathbb{N}$ such that f is (γ, η) -IOS with respect to (I, O) ? If so, find all such γ and η .*

Robustness

Solving the verification problem


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


We now consider the lattice M^Q of functions from the set of states Q of A to $M = \{1, 2, \dots, \gamma w\}$ where w is the largest weight in the automaton defining l .

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We now consider the lattice M^Q of functions from the set of states Q of A to $M = \{1, 2, \dots, \gamma w\}$ where w is the largest weight in the automaton defining l .

On M^Q we can define the operator $F : M^Q \rightarrow M^Q$ given by:

$$F(W)(q) = \max \left\{ \gamma H'(q), W(q), \min_{q' \in \text{Pre}(q)} W(q') - \eta \right\}.$$

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Theorem $((\gamma, \eta)$ -IOS Verification)

Let $f : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \Lambda^*$, $I : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$, and $O : \Lambda^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$ be defined by (weighted) finite state automata. Given $\eta, \gamma \in \mathbb{N}$, the transducer f is (γ, η) -IOS with respect to (I, O) iff the infimal fixed point of F , denoted by W^* , satisfies the following inequality for every $q \in Q$:

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Note that W^* is computed in $O(|Q| \cdot |\gamma w|)$ steps.

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- For the IOS verification problem, there exists a different operator whose fixed point characterizes the existence of (γ, η) for which f is (γ, η) -IOS.
- Furthermore, we can compute all the values of γ (but only some of the values of η) for which f is (γ, η) -IOS.

Robustness

Synthesis

How about synthesis?

Robustness

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
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Recall the automaton A :




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From A we can construct a monitor A_M for the (γ, η) -IOS property:



where the set of states of A_M is $M = \{1, 2, \dots, \gamma w\}$ with w being the maximum weight of the automaton defining I .

Robustness

Solving the synthesis problem

Theorem

Let $f : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \Lambda^*$, $I : \Sigma^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$, and $O : \Lambda^* \rightarrow \mathbb{N}_0$ be defined by (weighted) finite state automata. Given $\eta, \gamma \in \mathbb{N}$, the transducer f is (γ, η) -IOS with respect to (I, O) iff every reachable state (q, m) of $A \times A_M$ satisfies $H^O(q) \leq m$.

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- This result provides a different strategy for the verification problem: verify that the set $S = \{(q, m) \in Q \times M \mid H^O(q) \leq m\}$ is invariant;
- It also provides a solution to the synthesis problem: synthesize a controller to render the set S invariant;
- Since safety games can be solved in linear time, the complexity of synthesizing a controller enforcing (γ, η) -IOS is linear in the size of $A \times A_M$, i.e., it takes $O(|Q| \cdot |\gamma w| \cdot |\Sigma_c|)$ time.

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- How to make these ideas practical so that they become more useful. In particular, how to define metrics and costs in concrete problems?
- The ultimate objective is to understand robustness for cyber-physical systems.

Relevant recent references:

- *Robust Discrete Synthesis Against Unspecified Disturbances*
Rupak Majumdar, Elaine Render, and Paulo Tabuada
14th International Conference on Hybrid Systems: Computation and Control
2011.
- *A theory of ω -regular robust software synthesis*
Rupak Majumdar, Elaine Render, and Paulo Tabuada
To appear in the ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems.
- *Input-Output Robustness for Discrete Systems*
Paulo Tabuada, Ayca Balkan, Sina Caliskan, Yasser Shoukry, and Rupak
Majumdar
International Conference on Embedded Software 2012.

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